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Abstract- The government’s supply chain management 
(SCM) system is not adequately implemented in state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). There are weaknesses in the 
SOEs SCM enablers, strategies, policy implementation 
and poor enforcement of government SCM rules and 
regulations. This purpose of this study to determinant 
between government ownership (GOV), insider 
ownership (INSIDER) and bank dummy (Dbank) on 
company financial performance. In this study, financial 
performance is measured by return on equity (ROE). The 
population and sample consists of 20 government 
companies in Indonesian Public Listed. The period of this 
study is from 2013 to 2017. The results showed the GOV 
and INSIDER variables have an effect on ROE while the 
Dbank variable does not affect the company's financial 
performance. GOV negative influence on ROE. This 
shows government political motives. In addition, 
government-owned companies may have lower profits 
because they finance a project that does not bring 
financial gain but brings social benefits. INSIDER 
positive influence on ROE. This shows managerial 
ownership will encourage management to improve 
company performance, because they also have a 
company. 
Keywords- government, supply chain management, 
performance and ownership structure. 
 
1. Introduction  
The government’s SCM was designed to add value at 
each phase of the process and includes the main 
elements of demand management, acquisition 
management, logistics management, disposal 
management, risk management and regular assessment 
of the supply chain performance. [17] state that the 
separation of management functions and ownership 
functions is very influential with agency conflict. 
Agency conflicts occur because of differences in 
interests between shareholders and management 
(agents) regarding company profits. Agency conflicts 
can also occur between shareholders and managers, 
both of whom disagree about company profits. 
Conflicts can also occur between managers and debt 
holders, where managers prefer to use retained 
earnings for the company's expansion capital while 
debt holders prefer to use retained earnings to pay 
debts. Because the debt holders are worried that they 
cannot pay the company's debt so that there is a 
buildup of debt and creates an agency conflict between 
the two. The existence of agency conflicts between the 
two that will occur will cause costs to be used to 
control the conflict. The cost of the fee is called the 
agency cost. 
[16] state that the higher the level of insider 
ownership or managerial ownership, the better the 
financial performance, because the agent has become 
the owner and manager of the company and the goal is 
the same as the shareholders so that the conflict 
between the two is reduced. Insider ownership is the 
proportion of company stock ownership by people in 
companies such as directors and commissioners who 
are active in decision making measured by the 
percentage of the total shares owned by insiders in total 
outstanding shares. 
The higher institutional ownership will reduce the 
opportunistic behavior of managers who can reduce 
agency costs. Opportunistic behavior is behavior that is 
often done by managers to take advantage of all 
opportunities to achieve personal goals. Supervision of 
managers can reduce agency conflicts that can occur. 
When the agency conflict level is lower, the agency 
cost of the company will be lower and the company's 
performance will improve. A good company 
performance can be seen from the development of 
profits obtained by the company. 
The achievement of a company is closely related 
to the role and function of the company management. 
Therefore, the competitiveness of a company depends 
very much on the ability of a manager to manage their 
respective companies. In addition to the large role of 
the board in managing the bank so that it can produce 
good performance, the role of the bank owner is also 
very important because the bank owner will determine 
the selection of the board. The owner of a bank, like 
other corporate owners or porters, always wants to get 
the maximum profit by minimizing commercial risks. 
The company owner wants the manager to optimize the 
resources available to the company so that the board is 
able to generate maximum profits and manage the 
Int. J Sup. Chain. Mgt    Vol. 9, No. 1, February 2020 
 
728 
company as closely as possible. These results are 
similar with [23],[5],[7],[22],[21],[15],[12],[27] and 
[11] found that government ownership has a significant 
effect on company performance. While the results of 
[13, [10] and [9] who find ownership structures do not 
affect corporate profits. 
Therefore, the performance contract will be in the 
form of the owner and management of the company so 
that the interests of the management and the interests of 
the owner are equal. Achievement contracts will be 
established so that the compensation received by the 
board is related to the meeting with the companies 
achievements. The contractual relationship between 
owner and manager is in line with agency theory [17]. 
Stating the interests of the relationship between 
government owners and the ownership of shares by 
management on the company's performance, this study 
needs to be done to determinant between government 
ownership (GOV), insider ownership (INSIDER) and 
bank dummy (Dbank) on company financial 
performance. In this study, financial performance is 
measured by return on equity (ROE). 
2. Literature Review 
In the area of study of the influence of ownership 
on supply chain management and company 
performance, the most frequently used theory is agency 
theory. Agency theory describes the relationship 
between the owner as a principal and manager as an 
agent. The relationship is very important because it 
affects the performance of a company. Thus the 
competitiveness of a bank depends largely on the 
ability of managers to manage their respective banks. 
In addition to the magnitude of the role of managers in 
managing the bank in order to perform well, the role of 
the bankers is also vital for monitoring and ensuring 
that managers are working hard to advance the bank 
under its management. 
Therefore, in the relationship between the 
company owner and the manager usually there will be 
a performance contract where the company owners are 
aligning the interests of the manager with the interests 
of the companies owner. Performance contracts are 
formed so that rewards received by managers are 
closely linked to company performance. [17] reveal 
that the difference in importance between owners and 
managers that creates an agency conflict occurs 
because the manager does not hold company shares or 
has insufficient ownership. 
The concept of agency as disclosed by [17] can be 
seen in the results of the study of [6],[4] and [25] 
which indicate that bank owners are handing over to 
the manager as an agent to manage the bank. This is 
because the owner has difficulty managing the 
company directly because of the following factors. 
First, the size of a growing bank will be difficult to 
manage. Second, the need for specialized expertise to 
manage large banks and generally the owners have no 
such expertise. Third, bank ownership is determined by 
the number of shareholders. If the number of 
shareholders is too high and each person holds a small 
number of shares then this situation does not allow all 
owners to manage the activities of banks effectively. 
The manager can be seen as an agent by the bank 
owner who appoints them and is authorized and 
responsible for making the best decisions in the interest 
of shareholders. One way to measure success and 
efficiency of managers is to look at the profitability of 
the company. Performance can be measured through 
bank's ability to secure a stable profit while at the same 
time maintaining shareholder wealth increase in the 
company. 
[6] point out that managers may ignore the 
interests of shareholders, instead paying attention to 
their interests such as job continuity, luxury lifestyle, 
professional membership, personal vehicle facilities, all 
of which are borne by the company. [24] stipulate to 
address agency issues, shareholders have incentives to 
monitor managers so as to minimize the problem of 
principal-agents. However, the level of incentives 
depends on shareholder ownership. If the owner holds 
a small number of shares, the owner will not have the 
incentive to monitor the manager's behavior. This is 
because the profit earned by the owner is less than the 
cost of supervision. Therefore, it is expected that 
private banks, most of which are owned by a family, 
will have a better performance compared to 
government-owned companies. 
For a company that is largely owned by the family, 
conflicts between company owners and managers are 
rare. [3] notes that when a majority of the shares are 
owned by the family, it reduces the agency's problems 
compared to companies owned by many shareholders. 
In Indonesia, 90 percent of the company's shares are 
owned and operated by a family. This situation is not 
much different from other countries such as Spain [18]. 
[3] states that the advantages of a family owned and 
operated company are family members will manage the 
company and this will reduce agency problems. 
However, because a family is also a manager of the 
company, the agency problem will arise between the 
family, as a majority shareholder and a minority 
shareholder. In addition, according to [1] bank capital 
also affects the performance of a bank. Due to the large 
capital of private banks in Indonesia issued by 
individuals or families, they have higher incentives to 
monitor loans issued due to bank performance and their 
wealth will be affected by repayments. 
. Government-owned companies may not be 
efficiently managed because the board and 
management do not hold any shares in the company. 
This causes the company's performance to be affected 
[20] and [19]. The agency problem in the context of 
government ownership is more complicated as the 
government holds shares in the company on behalf of 
the public or the people. Since governments are led by 
politicians who have no ownership in these companies, 
they may not monitor the actions of the board of 
directors or management.  
According to explaining that the number of 
management shares or insider ownership will align 
management's interests with those of shareholders, with 
an increase in the percentage of managerial 
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shareholding, Manager is motivated to improve the 
company's performance well and be responsible for 
shareholder prosperity. The similarity of interests 
between management and shareholders can reduce the 
potential for conflict. Agency theory states that 
companies with managers as single shareholders 
(100%) will have an agency cost level equal to zero. 
This is a shareholding criterion above 50% that is 
owned by a particular manager or family which states 
that agency costs are significantly higher if outsiders 
manage the company than those in the company 
(insider). 
[17] is one of the ways to reduce agency costs 
in a company, namely the existence of insider 
ownership. The higher the level of insider ownership, 
the greater the information that is owned by 
management who is also the owner of the company, 
resulting in less agency costs, because the insider 
ownership or management has become the owner and 
manager because it has a larger share, and between 
shareholders and management will reduce conflict 
because managers know that profit or loss has a 
relatively similar impact between shareholders and 
management (agents). With this kind of thing where 
management (agent) has simultaneously become an 
agent and owner so that it can reduce the cost of 
supervision of the agent. This is because the 
information held by insiders about the company's plan 
is more complete than other shareholders. [17] stated 
that the greater the insider ownership, the management 
will optimize the use of available resources to 
maximize the value of the company so as to reduce 
agency conflict. 
[8] shows that managerial ownership has a 
significant effect on company performance. The 
division of managerial ownership is important because 
each group of shareholders has different financial 
incentives. The results of research from [26] show that 
manager ownership has a significant positive effect on 
company performance. [2] also stated that managerial 
ownership has a significant positive effect on company 
performance as measured by ROA and ROE. The 
results of research of [14] stated that managerial 
ownership has a significant positive effect on the 
company's financial performance as measured by sales 
growth, ROA and ROE.  
 
3. Research Method 
The population and sample consists of 20 government 
companies in Indonesia Public Listed. The period of 
this study is from 2013-2017. The data are taken from 
banks' annual reports. In this study using pooled 
ordinary least square (OLS). The following model is 
estimated: 
 
ROEit = • 0 + • 1*GOVit + • 2*INSIDERit + 
• 3*Dbankit +  eit    
Where 
 
ROEit: Return on equity of banks in period t, 
GOVit: the number of government shareholdings i in 
period t 
INSIDER it: the number of share ownership 
management i in period t 
Dbankit: A dummy variable that takes on a company 
value of one if i in period t, zero otherwise 
eit: error term of company i in period t. 
4. Result 
Table 1.  Comparisons of mean of selected variables bank and non bank company 
Ratios Means all bank (%) Means (%) p-Value(2 tailed) 
ROE 11.03  Ns 
Non bank  11. 64  
Bank  08.62  
    
Government Ownership 67.38  Ns 
Non bank  67.20  
Bank  68.07  
    
Insider Ownership 0.45  Ns 
Non bank  0.56  
Bank  0.02  
ns is not significant. 
 
Table 1 above shows that the listed average 
ROE of government-owned companies was reduced by 
11.03%, with ROE of non-bank-companies higher than 
bank companies, while there was no difference in ROE 
between bank and non-bank companies. Institutional 
ownership averaged 67.38% where bank companies 
were higher than non-banks. Because Government 
Ownership (GOV) bank companies are higher than 
non-banks, the managers reduce the amount of 
ownership because the purpose of government 
companies is greater on social goals so that the impact 
on dividends will be smaller. The results of different 
tests show that there is no difference between banks 
and non-bank companies. Meanwhile, Insider 
Ownership (INSIDER) of government-owned 
companies is an average of 0.45% where non-banks are 
higher than bank companies. This shows that managers 
are more interested in owning shares in government-
owned companies in non-banks because the profits of 
non-bank companies are higher to obtain higher 
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dividends. The results of different tests show that there 
are no differences between bank and non-bank 
companies. 
Table 2. The Result regression analysis 
Dependent variable: ROE 
Variable Ordinal Least Square 
Coef. p-value 
Constan 0.361 0.000***      
GOV -0.456 0.000***      
INSIDER 0.228 0.020**      
Dbank -0.074 0.422    
R-squared 20.4  
AdjustedR-squared 17.9  
Numberobservation 100  
*, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, p-value in parentheses 
Table 2 above shows that the GOV and 
INSIDER variables influence ROE while the Dbank 
variable has no effect. GOV negative influence on 
ROE. This shows that the ownership of a government-
owned company reduces the company's performance. 
This is because the existence of large government 
institutional ownership in a company makes 
government intervention on management performance 
to be large, thus making management feel bound and 
the manager's space is limited. The limitation of 
movement will encourage management to carry out 
dysfunctional activities, so that the presence of 
institutional parties that are too large in the company 
can have a negative impact on the company's 
performance. In addition, there is the possibility of 
supervision by the institution is less effective, so it 
needs supervision by external parties such as auditors. 
the objective of a politician who leads a government 
may differ from an individual who owns a business. 
Governments tend to political goals that may 
negatively affect the financial performance of the 
company. 
The stating that the company becomes an 
efficient due to agency problem arising from 
government political motives. In addition, government-
owned companies may have lower profits because they 
finance a project that does not bring financial gain but 
brings social benefits. These results are similiar with 
[23],[5],[7], [22],[21],[15],[12],[27] and [11].  
INSIDER positive influence on ROE. This 
shows Companies that have a high level of managerial 
ownership will generate high profitability. Managerial 
ownership will encourage management to improve 
company performance, because they also have a 
company. The greater the proportion of management 
ownership, the management tends to try harder for the 
benefit of shareholders in improving company 
performance. Improving the performance of this 
company will indicate a high asset turnover ratio. 
Managers who have company shares tend to carry out 
strategies to improve company performance in the long 
run. The greater the managerial ownership within the 
company, the more productive the manager's actions 
are in maximizing the company's performance and 
generating high asset turnover. The results of this study 
are similar with [8], [26], [2] and [14]. 
4. Conclusion 
In today’s volatile and complex business 
environment, it is more and more difﬁcult for supply 
chain managers to make decisions effectively, thereby 
both researchers and practitioners have an increased 
interest to investigate how to design an appropriate 
governance framework to guide the supply chain to 
collaborate successfully under such environment. This 
study aims to determinant government ownership, 
insider ownership and bank dummy on company 
performance. In this study, financial performance is 
measured by return on equity (ROE). The results 
showed that the GOV and INSIDER variables have an 
effect on ROE while the Dbank variable does not affect 
the company's financial performance. GOV negative 
influence on ROE. This shows that the ownership of a 
government-owned company reduces the company's 
performance. This is because the existence of a large 
government institutional ownership in a company 
makes government intervention on management 
performance to be large, thus making management feel 
bound and the space for managers to be limited thus 
demonstrating that government political motives. In 
addition, government-owned companies may have 
lower profits because they finance a project that does 
not bring financial gain but brings social benefits. 
INSIDER positive influence on ROE. This shows 
Companies that have a high level of managerial 
ownership will generate high profitability. Managerial 
ownership will encourage management to improve 
company performance, because they also have a 
company. 
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